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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 09-3854 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
PATRICIA HERNANDEZ, 
Appellant                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-08-cr-00506-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 10, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 11, 2011)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Patricia Hernandez seeks a new trial following a jury verdict finding her 
guilty of one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  She argues that the United States committed prosecutorial 
misconduct by improperly stating during closing argument that Hernandez knew that she 
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could not possess a firearm, which allegedly rendered her trial fundamentally unfair and 
deprived her of due process.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
 Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties who are familiar with the 
factual context and procedural history of this case, we will recite only the facts relevant to 
our analysis.  On April 3, 2008, police responded to a report of an individual with a gun 
at a residence and arrived to find Hernandez near the doorway of the kitchen.  When the 
officers ordered Hernandez to show her hands, she reached into her pocket, removed a 
shiny object, and tossed the object behind the kitchen doorway.  The arresting officer 
proceeded through the kitchen doorway and discovered an operable gun lying in a box of 
cat litter.   
At trial, the government presented its case and Hernandez offered one stipulation 
regarding her whereabouts before the incident.  During closing argument, Hernandez 
objected to the following statement by the prosecutor: 
So let’s freeze the picture right there. At that moment in time, what did the 
defendant know? She knows that she is a convicted felon.  She knows that 
as a convicted felon, she can’t possess a firearm, and she knows that she 
has a firearm sitting in her pants pocket. 
(Appendix 8.)  Hernandez timely objected, asserting that the inference drawn as to her 
purported knowledge was not in the record and improperly highlighted her decision not 
to testify.   
The District Court initially responded that the statement appeared to be a 
permissible inference based on Hernandez’s conduct at the time of arrest, but proceeded 
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to instruct the jury on the issue in its closing instruction.  The Court specifically noted 
that Hernandez’s decision not to testify was her right and could not be considered in any 
way in the jury’s deliberation.  Furthermore, the Court advised that Hernandez’s state of 
mind was not directly in the record, and that the government’s closing invited the jury in 
its discretion to draw an inference about Hernandez’s state of mind based on her conduct.  
Finally, the Court instructed that the government’s closing should not be construed as a 
comment upon Hernandez’s decision not to testify. 
 The jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
Discussion1
 Hernandez argues that the prosecutor made prejudicial comments during her 
closing argument that warrant the grant of a new trial.  Specifically, she challenges the 
government’s inference that she “knew” that she was not permitted to carry a firearm as 
being unsupported by the evidence presented at trial.  She contends that the inference 
impermissibly prejudiced the jury, as it suggested that the prosecutor possessed 
undisclosed evidence which could not be presented to the jury.  Hernandez emphasizes 
that the closing statements were particularly prejudicial since the only issue at trial was 
knowledge of possession of the firearm.  We disagree. 
 
The question of whether prosecutorial comments “so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process” is a narrow one, 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal case by virtue of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986), and “our case law punishes the 
government by granting a new trial . . . only if the defendant was prejudiced by the 
remarks in question,” United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 241 (3d Cir. 2000). 
As an initial matter, we are not convinced that the prosecutor’s statement 
regarding Hernandez’s alleged knowledge was improper.  We have consistently held that 
a “prosecutor is entitled to considerable latitude in summation to argue the evidence and 
any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.”  United States v. Lee, 
612 F.3d 170, 194 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Werme, 939 F.2d 108, 117 (3d 
Cir. 1991)).  Here, the District Court observed at the time of the prosecutor’s remarks that 
“the argument can be based on an inference drawn from her behavior, in addition to her 
knowledge that she has, at least, one felony conviction.”  (Supp. App. 176-77.)  The 
prosecutor’s inference was not unreasonable in light of the evidence actually presented at 
trial demonstrating Hernandez’s conduct at the time of her arrest and prior criminal 
history.  Accordingly, Hernandez has not demonstrated that the District Court abused its 
discretion by allowing this statement. 
Even if the prosecutorial conduct had been improper, however, it did not prejudice 
Hernandez.  “‘In determining prejudice, we consider the scope of the objectionable 
comments and their relationship to the entire proceeding, the ameliorative effect of any 
curative instructions given, and the strength of the evidence supporting the defendant’s 
conviction.’”  Helbling, 209 F.3d at 241 (quoting United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 
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1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Where, as here, the error is non-constitutional, “we will 
affirm ‘when it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.’”  Id. 
(quoting Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976)).   
First, the evidence presented by the United States in support of Hernandez’s 
conviction for possession of a firearm in violation of Section 922(g) was substantial.  The 
government adduced consistent testimony from several witnesses – including a civilian 
and two police officers – who directly observed Hernandez in possession of a weapon, 
satisfying the government’s burden of proof.  Second, the District Court provided an 
extensive curative instruction, ameliorating any potential prejudice.  The Court directed 
the jury that it alone would decide what inferences to draw based on the evidence in the 
record, and reminded the jurors on several occasions that statements by attorneys did not 
constitute evidence.  (Supp. App. 195-96.)  Moreover, the Court clearly told the jury that 
any remarks in the closing argument pertaining to Hernandez’s state of mind only invited 
the jurors to make their own inferences based on Hernandez’s conduct, and were not to 
be construed as a comment on Hernandez’s decision not to testify. 
Finally, the relationship of the objectionable comments to the entire proceeding 
was notably limited in scope.  As stated, the government did not need to prove 
Hernandez’s knowledge of the law, but only her possession of a weapon.  See § 922(g).  
Having advanced sufficient evidence to prove the latter element, the prosecutor’s 
subsequent remarks regarding Hernandez’s knowledge of the unlawfulness of her 
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behavior was unnecessary to a finding of guilt.  Additionally, “this statement was brief 
and isolated” within the larger evidentiary presentation.  See United States v. Weatherly, 
525 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding it “highly unlikely that [disputed] statement 
had any influence on the jury” where brief remark was part of extensive transcript).  “[I]f 
our review of the record convinces us that the jury would have convicted the defendant 
even had it not been exposed to the allegedly improper prosecutorial comments, we must 
conclude that no actual prejudice accrued.”  United States v. Liburd, 607 F.3d 339, 345 
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 770 F.2d 343, 350 (3d Cir. 
1985)).  Here, we are convinced that that the jury would have convicted Hernandez 
regardless of the prosecutor’s disputed remark.  See Helbling, 209 F.3d at 241. 
Accordingly, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Hernandez’s request for a new trial.  
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s decision.  
 
